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Introduction 
In 2007 Pakistan witnessed more than dozen attacks against its military, security forces, 
government officials, and civilians. A number of unknown terror plots have been disrupted, if not 
derailed, and raids have been conducted in cities such as Quetta, known for its historic ethnic-
nationalist struggle and links to the Taliban. The emphasis on the wave of terror that has reigned 
in Pakistan by the Urdu press in February 2007 suggests a widening conflict between the 
Pakistani government and the varied militia groups, as well as the influence of external factors, 
such as the U.S.-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in contributing to the recent violence throughout 
the country.[1]  
Soon after 9/11, Pakistan occupied center stage of the United States foreign policy concerns in 
South Asia. Given the country’s proximity to Afghanistan—the hub of al-Qaeda training camps 
and its ideological core—the United States sought Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s 
unequivocal support in its global war on terrorism. While Islamabad privately harbored concerns 
of allying with the United States, some Pakistani officials recognized that Musharraf had no 
choice but to reemerge as a strong partner on the U.S.-led war against terrorism.[2] Shortly after 
the Twin Towers attack, the pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with the United States and 
disengage the Taliban—a long-standing ally—was tremendous. Former Pakistani Foreign 
Secretary Shamshad Ahmad considered this “a moment of reckoning” for Pakistan, and an 
American scholar bluntly noted that Pakistan did not have an option: “There is no more being a 
friend of the United States and of Osama bin Laden.”[3] In Musharraf’s own words, “9/11 came as 
a thunderbolt” to the regime, thus forcing him to transform the previous policies of the state to 
align with U.S. national security interests.[4]  
By offering support, U.S. officials in New Delhi acknowledged that “Musharraf was sticking his 
neck out dangerously.”[5] Another senior U.S. policy analyst described the U.S.–Pakistan 
relationship as “alternating engagement and withdrawal,” but a retired Pakistani diplomat 
indicates the historic on-off U.S.–Pakistan partnership is in part due to neither country having 
“shared perspectives.”[6] He indicated that neither country has “continuity, a larger conceptual 
framework, and a shared vision” beyond issue-specific problems and solutions.[7] Observers 
have said that U.S.–Pakistan cooperation is tied to one core issue: the global war on terrorism.[8] 
As a partner on the war against terror, an inescapable conclusion, drawn from author’s interviews 
of both Pakistani and U.S. Government officials and supporting literature, is that no other country 
has provided more intelligence support, committed more troops, and captured more al-Qaeda 
operatives than Pakistan.[9] Even Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is quick to remind his 
country and the international community that “we [Pakistan] have broken the back of al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan.”[10]  
Disabling al-Qaeda through the country’s “capture and kill” policy includes the arrest and death of 
more than 700 al-Qaeda militants and dozens of Taliban activists operating inside Pakistan.[11] 
While this policy has permitted Pakistan to score a few successes on the war on terrorism, the 
President noted that “military action is never a solution. Eliminating terror networks in the long-
term depended not on the military’s prowess but sustained development, education, and 
economic growth—all of which the government takes credit for within the past six years. 
According to Musharraf, “Military action against extremism and terrorism buys time for a long-
term strategy to be executed, it busy time for other instruments to be used to get to the root. It is 
not the solution.”[12]  
Despite Pakistan’s Herculean efforts in the war on terror, the “trust deficit” among the United 
States and Pakistan lingers. Recent visits by U.S. officials to the region to prod Islamabad to “do 
more” on the war on terror are viewed unfavorably by Pakistani officials, including the President. 
According to a senior Pakistani official, the answer to U.S. expectations and demands of 
increased Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation is “what is the limit?” How much more Pakistan 
can do given its internal security threats from “extremism, obscurantism, and religious bigotry” 
and external challenges from neighboring countries remains to be seen.[13] What is clear are 
Musharraf’s constant reminder to the world that Pakistan has made a “great sacrifice” in the war 
on terror. In April 2007, Musharraf also indicated “Pakistan is being maligned by the West 
because of lack of understanding of the environment” and that he had no other alternative but to 
continue counter-terrorism cooperation.[14] Dozens of interviews of Pakistani officials, academics, 
and journalists conducted this year by the author reveal the estrangement between the two 
countries. The general perception is that U.S. expectations of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism 
cooperation are unrealistic, and America has yet to understand the various elements of 
extremism that poses an internal security threat to Pakistan.[15]  
The misperceptions stem partly from the different views that Pakistani and Americans have in 
defining and mitigating the terror threat.[16] Many Pakistanis disagree with the United States “war 
on terrorism,” a three letter word they say has nurtured a culture of suspicion of U.S. intentions 
and fostered the growth of anti-Americanism across the Muslim world, not only within Pakistan, 
against U.S. foreign policies.[17] A retired Pakistani General noted that there is “no clash of 
cultures” between the West and Islam; rather, “U.S. policies feed anti-Americanism [and] are 
seen as a destructive track policy.”[18] A retired U.S. Army officer also shared this view; he 
publicly said, “America and Pakistan are growing apart, [and partly because] U.S. channels are 
anti-Pakistan.”  
Furthermore, while the majority of terror analysts point to the civil war in Iraq as the breeding 
ground of terror networks, several observers and scholars of South Asia stress the importance of 
Pakistan, vice the Arab Muslim world, as the “center of terrorism [with] global reach.”[19] In both 
urban and rural areas of Pakistan, al-Qaeda and its supporters, the Taliban, and local militants—
who call themselves the mujahidin—have proven to conceal their identities, whereabouts, and 
activities in densely populated cities like Karachi as well as the sleepy hillsides of Khyber. Urban 
centers such as Rawalpindi and Mardan have offered temporary residence to key al-Qaeda 
leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida.[20] And the tribal belt that includes 
the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been 
coined ‘safe havens’ for terrorists and religious extremists as well as offer safe passage to the 
Taliban to and from the Afghan-Pakistan border.[21] It is these regions of Pakistan and the 
presence of jihadi groups in all the three bustling metropolitan cities of Karachi, Lahore, and 
Islamabad that some U.S. policymakers are “hinting” at the need for rule of law, free and fair 
elections, and a working judicial system in Pakistan.[22]  
Despite measured success against terrorists, Washington’s concerns over “Pakistan’s jihad 
culture” cast doubt on the country’s ability and willingness to reign in terror.[23] Mounting 
international pressure on Pakistan to eliminate the presence of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and local 
jihadi groups in the country that threaten American and Pakistani interests continue to exacerbate 
tensions between the two allies . Apart from internal threats to Pakistan, the country faces many 
setbacks and enduring obstacles. Additional factors of instability include the war in Afghanistan, 
ongoing fighting in the tribal areas against foreign militants, India’s meddling in Kabul’s affairs, 
low-intensity violence in Iranian Baluchistan, and the Kashmir conundrum. The conflicts in 
neighboring states—who have in part contributed to Pakistan’s growing terrorists and sectarian 
violence—will affect Pakistan’s internal security for years to come. External threats and the 
implications they will have on shaping Pakistan’s domestic political future will likely force 
Islamabad to improve its cooperation with neighboring states to minimize the extremist threat to 
the region.  
This report will examine the impact of religious extremism and sectarian violence on Pakistan and 
its neighbors, address key challenges ahead for the United States and Pakistan vis-à-vis the 
threat of terrorism within the region, and conclude with specific policy recommendations to 
improve the bilateral relationship. So long as al-Qaeda, religious extremists, and sectarian groups 
pose a threat to U.S. interests in the larger region, Pakistan will likely remain an important 
strategic partner.  
Mapping the Terrorist Terrain 
Studies by Western and Pakistani scholars, journalists, and a few outsiders have detailed, to the 
extent that is possible, the organizational structure, membership, and ideological and political 
goals of numerous militant outfits and the different tanzeems.[24] While a complete survey of 
Pakistan’s militant landscape is difficult for the simple reason that they are constantly evolving, it 
is possible to categorize the nature of Islamic radicals into broad groupings.[25] Based on publicly 
available literature and author’s fieldwork since 2005, five broad groupings emerge:  
1. Groups divided along sectarian lines. 
Many of these groups are influenced and organized by religious affiliation, to include the anti-Shia, 
Sipah e-Sahaba, and its Shia equivalent, Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan—both operate openly 
despite a brief period of hibernation.[26] Other groups have an ethno-nationalist orientation, such 
as the insurgency in Baluchistan, supported by Iran and with active support from Pashto-based 
tribes. While sectarian affiliation plays a major role, some groups share an ethnic bond. For 
example, The Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), founded by its leader Altaf Hussain represents 
the muhajir (or migrants from India to Pakistan) and is based in Karachi. Hussain, an icon of the 
movement, represents the city’s “martyrs and prisoners” and is today a viable opposition party.[27] 
Many sectarian groups are often supported by external actors, such as neighboring countries in 
South Asia, and Arab states, thereby enabling them to influence these groups with their Wahhabi 
and Deobandi traditions.[28]  
2. Groups supporting the Kashmiri jihad. 
Under this umbrella are a wide range of extremists, such as the Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakat-ul-
Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, and other Deobandi organizations. Though the 
primary goal is to liberate Kashmir from Indian control, some of these groups share a sectarian 
affiliation with other groups. Having fought the Soviet Union during the Afghan jihad, these groups 
are well-equipped, well-trained, and resource rich, relying on support from Pakistan’s intelligence 
agencies to wage a war of attrition against the Indian army.[29]  
3. The Taliban and its affiliates. 
Members of these groups are Pashtun nationalists and operate in the open frontier province of 
Pakistan such as the FATA and NWFP, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and inside 
Afghanistan. Their aim is to overthrow the ruling elites of Kabul for an Islamic-style government 
that would be led by the Taliban. Influenced by “Paktunwali,” the traditional Pushtun code of 
honor, and a “village Islam,”[30] the Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Omar would likely resume 
power. Groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan include a mix of conservative and moderate groups: 
Jamiat-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar Group), Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis Group), Itehad-e-Islami, 
Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Mahaz-e-Milli, and Jubba-e-Milli. [31]  
4. Religious political parties with a hard-line and ultra-conservative posture. 
Of particular importance is the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of six fundamentalist parties 
led by Qazi Hussein’s Jamiat Islami and Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islami.[32] The party 
is anti-Musharraf, rejects secularism, and strongly advocates an Islamic government as defined 
by the party’s leadership. While advocating change by using the political process, they have and 
are sometimes linked with jihadi/extremist groups. Their narrow, literalist view of Islam could 
silence the voice of secularists and liberal Islamists.  
5. New jihadi groups.  
Over the last six years, the crackdown on sectarian groups and well-known jihadi groups involved 
in terrorist activities has likely forced the creation of a new generation of jihadis with a virulent 
anti-Western outlook. A researcher in Karachi told the author that the young male students, who 
may be affiliated with the Jamiat ud-Dawa, are ready to kill the U.S. President. So strong is their 
hatred that these men are ready to wage jihad, he indicated.[33] An updated book by Indian 
scholar Amir Rana also highlights the emergence of new groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Umar, 
who view the overthrow of Musharraf “a religious duty.”[34] Other groups include Al-Mansuria and 
al-Intiqam. Of growing concern are the exploitation of radical women, as is evident in this year’s 
recent Jamia Hafsa case—where women of the seminary were used by the maulvis to protect 
their interests and threaten the government of suicide attacks.[35]  
Evidence of the various groups’ overlapping membership, shared goals, and close affiliation with 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda is an open secret, dating back to the Afghan jihad—a period when 
Pakistan’s active support of the mujahidin contributed to the “jihadi culture” that exists today.For 
decades, the Pakistani government courted and managed Islamist groups to advance its political 
and foreign policy goals. The United States also courted the jihadis for their national security 
interests; both Pakistan (under the Zia ul-Haq legacy) and the United States exploited the 
mujahideen during the Cold War era without much consideration to the impact of the Afghan jihad 
on either country. Today, the Afghan jihad continues to define the starting point from which 
Pakistanis view the fall-out of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship and the “legacy of bitterness” that 
has followed.[36]  
Therefore, the legacy left by Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq during the late 1970s and through the 
early 1990s further solidified the government’s ties to extremist groups.[37] A senior Pakistani 
editor defines the 1980s as a period when Pakistan’s intelligentsia “exploited the fanaticism of the 
jihadi warriors to fight Pakistan's proxy wars for it in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir. In pursuing 
this strategy, the military acted as a midwife, giving birth to a murderous jihadi culture which went 
on to consume it.”[38]  
Pakistan was not alone. The United States, and other Gulf countries, similarly benefited from the 
Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan and contributed to the “Kalashnivkov” culture that emerged in 
Pakistan.[39] The large influx of Afghan refugees, who brought with them their weapons, drugs, 
and militants to Pakistan, contributed to the “rise [of] Pakistani militancy and terrorism.”[40]  
During Zia’s rule, the proliferation of religious seminaries of all sectarian persuasions served 
Pakistan’s interests during the Afghan jihad, but also contributed to the clashes and political 
infighting among the different schools and their leaders. The Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahle e-Hadith 
and others held separate positions on how to transform Pakistan into a “Muslim” country, but 
failed to agree on a system of Islamic governance.[41] After Zia’s sudden death, follow-on 
governments remained hostage to sectarian groups, religious parties, and extremists such as the 
Taliban, for a host of geopolitical and domestic reasons.[42]  
Therefore, religious conflict remains a key source of tension in Pakistan. In recent years, 
Pakistan’s religious parties have been revived and organized along sectarian affiliation. While the 
Jama’at-i-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamist party, eschews sectarian violence, the party’s call for 
an Islamic state is its ultimate objective. Other Islamist parties are organized along various 
schools of thought, representing key Barelvi or Deobandi political aspirations, which are reflected 
in at least 25 percent of Pakistan’s religious seminaries, or madaris.[43] According to a Pakistani 
Islamic scholar, the religious class in Pakistan yields enormous power. He indicated their financial 
contributions from the population, including Pakistani government officials, support a booming 
madrasa system which is the fabric of Pakistani society. “Even the Pakistani army supports the 
ulema (religious scholars) in the madaris,” thereby affirming the importance of da’wa (i.e., the 
propagation of Islam) across the country.[44]  
Many extremist groups might be considered privileged Islamists because they are able to sustain 
their movements within a legitimate political space permitted by the current regime. While several 
militant groups have been declared illegal—and are on the U.S. Government’s list of terrorist 
groups—some organizations are able, even encouraged, to campaign for political office, gain 
access to the media, and enjoy the government’s hands-off policy. So long as militant groups do 
not strike at Pakistani or Western interests, they continue to thrive. Jama’at ud-Da’wa, formerly 
the banned Lashkar e-Taiba, is a case in point.[45] This and other group’s extensive social 
services project, from housing to education, enable them to win the support of a largely illiterate 
society and disallow the government from taking punitive measures against them.[46]  
Furthermore, religious Islamists’ participation in the 2002 elections increased their political clout. 
For example, the MMA’s victory in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) reflect growing 
concerns that religious parties with deep anti-U.S. sentiment yield influence in areas where the 
Pakistani Government has little access, control, or power.[47]  
Finally, both U.S. and Pakistani authorities express concern that the al-Qaeda leadership 
continues to exploit and depend on its networked relationship with Pakistani militant groups to 
survive as an organization and spawn a new generation of violent jihadis that threaten the 
region’s precarious stability.[48] Al-Qaeda also has exploited the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and 
Iraq to motivate Pakistani youth to wage jihad against the West and perceived secular regimes, 
such as Pakistan. Widening support for the message of Bin Laden—the “James Bond that never 
dies”—exists within the country’s select mosques and religious schools.[49] Author’s interviews of 
Deobandi and Barelvi imams in Karachi, for example, suggest that so long as Bin Laden is alive, 
Pakistani youth will be inspired and radicalized by the movement he has spawned.  
The Challenges of Religious Extremism 
While Pakistan has proved a valued partner in the war on terrorism, progress has come at a high 
political cost and rising domestic pressure against Musharraf for siding with the United States.[50] 
Two assassination attempts against Musharraf in late 2002 and attempts at other senior leaders, 
including Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, come at the heels of Pakistan’s alliance with the United 
States. Recent attacks against the Pakistani army in the north and in Baluchistan, suicide 
bombings against Western hotels, and sectarian violence are indicative of the increased tensions 
between the government and its opponents. The new wave of attacks in Pakistan over the past 
two months and the increasingly vitriolic statements by militants blaming Musharraf for his pro-
U.S. policies are likely to increase as Pakistan forges a closer alliance with America.[51]  
One of the key concerns several Pakistanis articulated to the author comes in the form of a 
question: ‘how much more can Pakistan do in the war on terror?’ Increased U.S. demands for 
Pakistan to “do more” has created a climate of distrust and disenchantment with the United 
States in its overall engagement (or occupation) of the Muslim world. For example, the current 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deepen the misperception that Pakistan—and other Muslim 
countries—are an instrument of the West.[52] Growing antipathy against the United States in the 
Pakistani press spotlight the “trust deficit” as well as Islamabad’s perceived courtship with militant 
Islamists. In a seminar in April by the Pakistan Institute for International Affairs (PIIA) in Karachi, 
several participants worried that the U.S.–Pakistan partnership was a one-sided relationship. 
Based solely on terrorism cooperation, participants told the author the bilateral relationship is 
short-sighted and could be short-lived.[53] The Chairman of the institute further indicated “You 
can not wage a war against terrorism. You can only counter it,” therefore implying that a universal 
definition for “terrorism” had first to be defined and agreed upon by the international 
community.[54]  
Currently, the United States have a vested interest in assisting Pakistan, so long as the war on 
terrorism is a driving force—the accepted Pakistani view—and the United States will be engaged 
in India, its long-term strategic partner, partly because the Indian elephant is a competitor against 
the Chinese tiger.[55] According to a Western source, Pakistan is key to U.S. policymakers 
because of short-term U.S. tactical interests, but “India is the future.”[56] But that view might 
change, as more attention is drawn towards Pakistan as the “center of gravity” for international 
terrorism.[57]  
The additional challenge of managing sectarian groups, which continue to serve as a buffer 
against New Delhi and allow Islamabad to yield some influence over Kabul’s political future, may 
stall reform and distract Pakistan from increasing its goodwill efforts to improve relations with 
neighboring states to mitigate terrorism in the region. Some in Washington doubt that Islamabad 
will ever be able to become a global power, so long as the army holds onto the political seat. 
While democracy and civilian institutions are an important indicator of a stable society, Islamabad 
is bound by other concerns.  
In recent months, two domestic crises have challenged the government’s resolve and captured 
headlines worldwide: the Jamia Hafsa case and the suspension of the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice. Both cases have sparked civil unrest and sharp criticism from the press. In the first case, 
threats made by the Jamia Hafsa women have stunned most Pakistanis. Daily editorials from 
mainstream Pakistani newspapers reflect the public’s distaste with the government’s inaction. In 
an op-ed in early April in the Daily Times, the writer indicates, “no other country in the world 
[except Pakistan] lets its citizens take the law into their own hands and becomes [the] accusers, 
judgers and dispensers of justice.”[58] Another journalist indicates the Jamia Hafsa case sends 
the message that “Pakistan’s mosques and seminaries raise terrorists and not scholars.”[59]  
The second case involving the suspension of the Supreme Chief Justice also remains unresolved 
and contentious. Since the March 2007 incident, the government has faced mounting opposition, 
including exiled leaders; a well-known Pakistani writer Ayaz Amir in late March called the episode 
Musharraf’s “biggest blunder whose fallouts will be far [more] dangerous than Kargil.”[60] An Urdu 
slogan inscribed on the Pindi chapter of the High Court Bar Association, tumhari aik naan, 
tumhein amar kar gai accurately reflects the idea that the government’s actions against Chaudhry 
will come at a high-cost and not be easily forgotten.[61] The government is faulted for 
“manhandling” the Chief Justice and using force against the lawyer community and the media.[62]  
Coincidentally, the two incidents occurred this spring. The timing of the two events within weeks 
of one another not only weakens the government’s position but will force Islamabad to quickly 
resolve the crises. A popular opinion voiced in the Pakistani press is the government’s intention to 
allow “anarchy” created by the radicals of the Jamia Hafsa case to “divert attention [away] from 
the judicial crisis.”[63] These events could cast a shadow of doubt on the government’s intention 
to uphold free and fair elections later this year. The events could further prompt the international 
community to question Musharraf’s ability to move Pakistan towards an open political system that 
stymies corruption, mismanagement of resources, and nurtures a liberal religious movement 
capable of diluting the loud voices of right-wing maulvis, jihadi politicos, and their supporters. How 
Islamabad resolves this incident will be a test of Musharraf’s policy of “enlightened moderation.” 
What matters now is how he intends to peacefully resolve these issues while maintaining a grip 
on his political seat.[64]  
Related to the Jamia Hafsa case is madrasa reform. The military’s push to reform the former 
Pakistan’s Madrasa Ordinance Act has come under great scrutiny by Western and Pakistani 
observers. According to a former Pakistani civil servant—who conducted a thorough study of 
madaris in one Punjab locale years ago—the registration of madaris is “a failed project.”[65] 
While seminaries that registered under the new law received a slush fund to teach ‘mainstream’ 
education, it was unclear whether the government followed through with this proposal. The 
Pakistani source added that Pakistan appears not to be committed to madrasa reform, given the 
widely held perception that so long as these religious schools do not threaten the government, 
they are permitted to operate. The trouble is, however, that many madaris’ administrators act 
above the law. While some encroach on public land and teach an austere form of Islam, they also 
provide a social welfare system that the government is unable to currently replace.  
In sum, mounting domestic pressure by political Islamists, including the neo-conservative 
oppositionists, could impede Pakistan from strengthening its ties to the United States.[66] The 
strength of the militants lies in their ability to propagate their message, maintain a steady level of 
recruitment, and position themselves as anti-state so long as Pakistan is perceived as backing 
the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. The combined threat to Pakistan by al-Qaeda remnants, 
sectarian groups, and religious extremists pose significant challenges and risks. The publication 
of a myriad of violent jihadi and right-wing news and magazines and their circulation to hundreds, 
if not thousands, of supporters and sympathizers in the northern areas and urban centers such as 
Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad confirm the importance of extremists’ rhetoric, allure, and 
ongoing activism.[67] That the Pakistani Government is unaware or unable to shut down the 
groups that enjoy privileged access to the print media is an unanswered question. It remains 
unclear if, and the extent to which, an alliance between some of these groups and the Pakistani 
military exists. Of the groups the government is pitted against, it would be a tall order to expect 
that Islamabad could eradicate all sectarian and militant groups without assistance from regional 
allies and outside support.  
External Implications of a Rising Threat  
Pakistan’s relations with its neighbors, namely India and Afghanistan, have been defined by 
mutual distrust and interference.[68] While Pakistan and Iran are considered friendly rivals, a 
resurgent Taliban and Iran’s meddling in Baluchistan could alter their relationship.  
Of the many challenges ahead, a resurgent Taliban using Pakistan to maneuver, regroup, and 
rearm destabilizes not only Pakistan’s internal security but damages Afghan-Pakistan relations. 
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid’s recent statement, “Taliban bases and sanctuaries in 
Pakistan are at the heart of the problem,” point specifically to Quetta as the Taliban base and 
safe haven.[69] The exploitation of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which 
Ahmed considers the “world’s [new] ‘terrorism central’, inhabited by Pashtun tribes, has refocused 
attention in Washington and Islamabad.[70] The penetration of the tribal belt by al-Qaeda—once 
an ally of Pakistan’s intelligentsia—and the Taliban is publicly acknowledged by the Pakistani 
military.[71] According to Pakistan’s military spokesman, Major General Shaukat Sulat, “We don’t 
deny the Taliban come and go, but that is not the entire truth.”[72] Whatever the truth may be, 
greater U.S. engagement in Afghanistan creates risks for Pakistan. After the United States 
assumed control of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban said 2007 will be “the bloodiest year 
for foreign troops” and have indicated a ready supply of at least 2,000 suicide bombers for their 
spring offensive against the United States.[73] Concerns of the “Talibanisation of Pakistan” 
presents enormous challenges ahead for the multiple countries engaged in Kabul, whose future is 
linked closely to Islamabad’s actions.[74]  
Another contentious issue between the two neighboring countries is the Durand Line. Some 
scholars indicate Pakistan’s exploitation of the threefold frontier for “covert asymmetrical warfare” 
has now caused Islamabad to lose control of the area to the Taliban and other militant groups.[75] 
Afghanistan, too, lacks a formal policy on the frontier area, and has said publicly it does not 
recognize the Durand Line as an international border. Efforts to improve the Afghan-Pakistan 
stalemate has included recent talks to form a Grand Jirga, or council of leaders, between the two 
countries intended to establish peace in Afghanistan and restrict cross-border infiltration.[76] 
Other options include Pakistan’s plan to fence and mine the porous border to counter 
Afghanistan’s charges of cross-border incursions. Musharraf indicated Pakistan would fence 
approximately 35 kilometers of eight points in the NWFP, and consider fencing a 250 kilometer in 
Baluchistan. Even these options are subject to debate and do not guarantee that insurgents and 
other militias would be prohibited from crossing the unmanned Afghan-Pakistan border.  
The Taliban’s rise also bedevils Pakistan’s relationship with Iran, who “gained from the collapse 
of the Taliban” before 9/11.[77] A reemerging Taliban once again puts the Iran and Pakistan 
relationship at risk. Islamabad’s fear of an of Iranian inspired Shia subversion inside Pakistan, 
rooted in the 1979 Shia revival, may be unfounded as regional stability serves Iran’s interests.[78] 
However, Iran is keen not to provoke the rise of a militant Sunni regime in Afghanistan and is 
particularly “on guard that Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism does not become ascendant.”[79]  
While a crackdown against the Taliban suits Pakistan’s immediate interests, it is not clear how 
Pakistan will be able to sever its ties completely with Kashmiri separatists. Pakistan’s original plan 
to drive India out of Jammu and Kashmir by then ISI Director-General Hamid Gul has since 
evolved, although observers suggest that Islamabad will continue to support Kashmiri separatists 
so long as India remains the dominant power in the region.[80] Several studies examining the 
ISI’s heavy-handed role in Kashmir and Pakistan’s Kashmir policy are of considerable importance, 
but few have addressed alternative solutions to a systemic problem between India and 
Pakistan.[81] Most South Asian experts would agree that Islamabad’s support for the Islamic 
militancy “remains [the country’s] most successful strategic weapon against Indian regional 
hegemony, including its penetration into Afghanistan.”[82] Hence, an unresolved Kashmir conflict 
could complicate Pakistan’s efforts to curtail terrorism and sectarianism for years to come.[83] Of 
course, the Kashmir crisis may not be the only dispute that prohibits Pakistan and India from 
long-term cooperation. An American expert on Pakistan makes it clear that “even if Kashmir is 
‘resolved,’ in the long term India will continue to develop economically and militarily in ways that 
Pakistan cannot owing to the vast differences in resources and national potential of the two 
states.”[84] Still, a resolution on Kashmir could open the doors of opportunity for both countries.  
Other issues of prime importance to Pakistan’s stability include the Baluch separatist movement 
and the influence that al-Qaeda and other religious groups yield across the country. The 
government’s crackdown against Baluch national leaders has arguably fanned additional reprisals 
against Islamabad; Pakistani scholar Asma Jehangir said a “war-like situation” had emerged in 
Baluchistan, and the former Baluch leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, blamed the government for 
“fanning terrorism and destruction” in the province.[85] These accusations—and frequent strikes 
held to protest the state’s development projects—only solidify the increased conflict between the 
government and the unrelenting power of the separatists in Baluchistan.[86]  
Finally, the greatest challenge to Pakistan is arguably the rise of militant Islam, both as an 
ideology and political force. The number of organized and ad hoc groups in Pakistan today that 
represent a radical form of “political Islam” is unknown, but arguably have a mass following from 
various quarters of society, including some elites, members of the armed forces, a booming 
madrasa population, and women. The latter group is new and is represented by right-wing 
women’s groups, either as members of extremist organizations or leaders of a new educational 
class that has emerged in the last five years.[87] This could include the Al-Huda Organization, a 
conservative Islamic educational institute for girls, with establishments in Karachi, Islamabad, and 
some rural areas. While not supporters of terrorism, neo-conservative, right wing women’s groups 
arguably are more susceptible to extremist ideology than liberal, secular organizations. Different 
radical Islamists also hold a wide range of religious ideas that appear to contradict one another 
and highlight the sources of friction among them.[88] For example, the Barelvi’s respect for a 
spiritual guide, or pir, is rejected by the Deobandi tradition of subscribing to only the Qur’an and 
the Prophet’s traditions, or hadith.[89]  
Keeping track of the myriad of radical groups cultivated by some support from other Muslim 
countries—namely, the wealthy Gulf Arab patrons—will render it difficult for Pakistan to penetrate 
their networks, institutions, and newer establishments. A more robust counter terrorism strategy, 
with improved human intelligence and access to extremists’ communications, is therefore key to 
Islamabad’s success in staying alert of the changing face of terror.  
Predicting Future Outcomes 
The use of three future political outcomes is intended to aid understanding of the significant 
challenges that Pakistan faces in mitigating the terrorist threat. While not offering definitive 
answers, the three possible outcomes of Pakistan’s political future will enable both U.S. and 
Pakistani policymakers to explore some of the more fundamental questions that might arise in the 
years ahead. Their purpose is therefore to address and spark a discussion of some of the issues 
and problems that could arise, either to complement the prospects for peace in the region or 
complicate existing security arrangements.  
Before outlining the three possible political outcomes, there are a few core assumptions that are 
likely to hold true in the near-term. These include, but are not limited, to the following: 
1. Pakistan’s ethno-linguistic, tribal, sectarian, and religious communities comprise a 
sharp kaleidoscope of identities.[90]  
Any future political system will need to confront the dynamic communities in Pakistan as they 
relate to one another and the state. The ground realities of sectarian strife, varied ideological 
groups, and conflicting interpretations of political Islam set in motion an ongoing process of 
conflict and cooperation that could either be integrated into the mainstream political system or 
cause a political explosion. The likely competition for scarce resources, the distribution of skills, 
knowledge, and religious dominance means varying political Islamists, as well as religious 
extremists, might struggle vociferously for public support and political power.  
2. Influential militant Islamists, some linked to terror networks, will maintain a grip on the 
population for legitimacy, credibility, and independence from the state structure.  
Varied militant groups, both sectarian and extremists, have for years operated within a political 
space afforded them by the state which has permitted them to firmly establish themselves as free 
agents, even though previously they were instruments of coercion and of convenience. Not 
feeling bound to Pakistan’s state policies, these groups will likely undertake action within their 
own rules, norms, and principles to harness their strengths and goals. The JUI-F militants’ failure 
to abide by the recently signed treaty with the government is an example of the militants’ strength 
to act with impunity and disregard the center of power in Islamabad.[91]  
3. Pakistan will unlikely be able to monitor all trans-boundary activities, creating the need 
for greater reliance on collective security and collective burden-sharing with the people.  
Using a central, activist, and effective participatory approach that requires the cooperation of the 
Pakistani public in centers of terrorist activity, such as select neighborhoods in the cities or known 
areas in key provinces, can help ensure a national effort to address particular issues or specific 
regional concerns. In exchange for public support, the state should consider making available 
state-funded and organized social and welfare programs to scores of Pakistanis, who currently 
receive such aid from militant and sectarian groups. (i.e., JuD uses its provision of social services 
to win the public’s support and fulfill a religious duty.)[92]  
Examining Varied Political Scenarios 
The debate over Pakistan’s likely future is part of a larger scholarly dialogue about the structure 
of its political system and style of governance. While structural theories focus on the distribution 
and changing nature of power, the following three scenarios are intended to examine very broad 
outcomes and political behaviors, rather than focus on any specific actor within the structure of 
the system.[93]  
While the future of Pakistan is always accompanied by an element of surprise, two factors are 
predictable: the grip of the army, the oldest institution, will be central to any political form of 
governance the country pursues; and the ulema will likely play a role in defining the contours of 
state policy by exerting greater assertiveness in the country’s political future.[94]  
The three different outcomes are as follows:  
1. Strong central government 
This can manifest in the rule by moderate Islamists; rule by the hard-line mullahs (or ulema); or 
the rule by the military (i.e., also called the Fauji culture).[95] A central government has defined 
much of Pakistan’s political history, in which power has been concentrated in the hands of a few. 
In the short-term, a central government model may offer stability to the country vis-à-vis the 
region by exercising tight control of the population to counter dissent while developing policies to 
ensure Pakistan’s stability in a precarious region. In the long-run, tremendous power in the hands 
of a few resembles not only an oligarchy but helps to undermine a healthy political process from 
which democracy could emerge. Among the three choices above, rule by the moderate Islamists 
is preferable, but rule by the military might be desirable, given Pakistan’s geopolitical constraints 
and the rising threat of sectarian conflict and terrorist threats. The problem with existing moderate 
Islamists, however, is that the country’s two civilian parties—the People’s Party of Pakistan and 
the Muslim League—have stained their political tenure with corruption, abuse of power, and 
contributed to the country’s educational demise as well as the spread of militant Islam. Without 
other civilian alternatives, a central government led by the PPP or PML is questionable.  
2. Participatory politics 
The inclusion of multiple parties and voices in Pakistan’s government helps pave the road to 
democracy.[96] It bears noting that while a full-fledged democracy has yet to take shape in 
Pakistan, the constitutions of 1956 and 1973 helped to develop the “democratic culture.” The 
military regimes of F.M. Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, and Gen. Zia ul-Haq, however, 
suspended the early institutions of democracy and replaced it with “corruption, incompetence, 
and nepotism.”[97] Also, if democracy means a political system whereby the people, as active 
participants, determine the political outcome of the country, with an independent judiciary and the 
rule of law, then Pakistan would be excluded.[98] Aside from the 1971 election that brought 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power, Pakistan’s history is described as the rule of dictators.[99] Today, a 
participatory government would include all facets of Pakistan’s diverse political landscape, 
including moderate and militant Islamists, secularists, and a host of other parties affiliated with 
Islam but do not carry the Islamic slogan to represent their end goals. This form of government 
would be most desirable to the United States, other foreign actors, and regional players; all could 
benefit from a system where debate and dialogue of key policy issues would occur before the 
state made any decisions. Such a system would adequately represent its constituents and ensure 
a balance of power.[100] In this scenario, the military would be integrated into a civilian 
infrastructure, allowing for greater civilian-military cooperation on key foreign policy issues. 
Keeping the military engaged would be necessary for geopolitical reasons, but also to 
acknowledge that in times of crisis, the military has played a stabilizing role. Even under civilian 
rule, the link the military can not be easily severed, but integrating the military into a participatory 
model would enable the government to better manage lawlessness, corruption, and restore 
justice.[101]  
3. Social unrest 
Several factors could be contributing factors to wider social discord in the country. The country’s 
diverse ethnic and religious makeup is one factor that has proven to divide people into groupings, 
and plays a role in creating opposing parties. Thus, ethnicities of all hues in Pakistan consider 
themselves a member of their specific ethnic family before they identify themselves as proud 
nationalists. Pakistanis also attribute to their identity the school of religious thought, or religious 
leader, even above their ethnic affiliations. These separations have proven to lead to ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts and ameliorate the tensions among Pakistanis. This scenario is the least 
favorable, and arguably only a military government could reign in the various factions with an iron 
fist to preclude national chaos. Today, the military is able to moderately manage ongoing threats 
to the state, such as the ethnic-nationalist struggle in Baluchistan, although it is unclear—and 
unlikely—that the government will be able to devote its resources, time, and energy to internal 
conflicts while countering external threats. A government of moderate Islamists may not yield the 
power necessary to crush such uprisings, unless the military offers a helping hand. Radical 
Islamists, on the other hand, might benefit from social unrest and insist that an Islamic state is the 
solution to unifying disparate peoples. Exploiting people’s sentiments towards religion might, in 
the short-term, serve to unify a diverse country, but will likely fail to protect the country from 
internal power politics. Whatever the solution to social discord, the problem is likely to impact 
neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, whose Pashtun population share familial and tribal 
links with Pakistan, and further upset Islamabad’s relations with New Delhi and Tehran.  
Recommendations  
Given regional realities and imperfect regional partners, U.S. choices in Pakistan will be viewed in 
the context of America’s broader foreign policy portfolio in South Asia. Washington will need to 
reconsider how to best develop policies towards Pakistan within the backdrop of current threats 
and regional instability. Providing Pakistan with the necessary resources—political, economic, 
and military—to undertake the momentous task of rooting out terror groups and their 
sympathizers should be contingent on Islamabad’s performance within a realistic timetable. 
Likewise, Pakistan’s desire to cement closer ties with Washington should be aligned with the 
peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes with its neighbors for overall long-term stability in the 
region.[102]  
Looking for Alternatives  
For the United States  
Re-balancing U.S. policy towards Pakistan to reduce the long-term spillover of extremism and 
radical Islam into the region should take into account two key points: first, an increased U.S. 
diplomatic presence in Pakistan can be stabilizing. This would convince Pakistan—and regional 
allies, such as Afghanistan—that America is genuinely interested in promoting stability among 
uncertain neighbors and will act as a mediator to reduce the seeds of conflict among the New 
Delhi-Islamabad-Kabul axis. Second, increased U.S. engagement with Pakistan and its allies 
opens several routes for a vigorous dialogue within Pakistan, particularly among the 
conglomerate of Islamists, on key issues, such as Kashmir and the question of the army’s support 
for the cross-border insurgency.  
Regarding the first point, projecting U.S. goodwill and trust will be central to winning Pakistan’s 
trust and erasing years of mistrust and misperceptions of America’s intentions in South Asia. 
Senior U.S. military officers in Islamabad correctly noted that the United States should consider 
an active public relations campaign to communicate to the Pakistani public that Pakistan is and 
will remain a full partner that extends beyond Pakistan’s cooperation on the war on terrorism.[103] 
A media campaign to clarify misperceptions about the U.S.–Pakistan partnership to the Pakistani 
people can diffuse the propaganda that extremists spread about U.S.–Pakistan cooperation. 
Measures to improve the two countries’ long-term relationship also could include “U.S. 
statements of respect for a moderate Islamic Pakistan [to] help dispel concerns about religious 
bias.”[104]  
Reform in Pakistan need not be restricted to the political realm. Washington can further aid 
Islamabad in investing in its public and religious education sector, thus helping to improve the 
country’s high illiteracy rate. Author’s personal visits of the largest girl’s madrasa in Quetta, 
owned and managed by Dr. Qari Abdul Rashid, attest to the need for widening education reform 
in religious schools to include a broad understanding of religious texts and acceptance of the 
different religious schools, known as madhab. Washington should continue working closely with 
the Pakistani Government to track progress made on madaris reform, which needs to include 
practical skills training to students, both boys and girls, such as computer literacy and foreign 
affairs, to expose Pakistani youth to a fast-paced, changing global environment. Absent these 
changes, Pakistan will continue to maintain an alarming illiteracy rate that could potentially 
preclude the country from competing on the world stage.  
Furthermore, Washington could help Pakistan gradually move towards moderate/liberal Islam in 
two ways: a) offering increased support to the intelligentsia and armed forces to undermine 
radical Islamists and their movements; and b) supporting Islamic institutions, charities, and 
women’s groups to promote moderate activism and peaceful engagement with the West. To the 
first point, careful not to interfere in Pakistan’s religious institutions, Washington can work with the 
ISI to penetrate radical groups, collect intelligence, and detain suspected terrorists, all in the 
name of protecting Pakistan from falling prey to militant ideologies. Regarding the second point, 
Washington should consider funding Islamic groups and community leaders who practice and 
teach moderation and acceptance of other worldviews. Support for these groups will engender a 
positive image of the United States and open the pathways of awareness among the people of 
both countries.  
Within Pakistan’s foreign policy portfolio, Washington should consider acting as the mediator 
between Pakistan and its neighbors to resolve outstanding disputes. Being a buffer between India 
and Pakistan, Washington can encourage the two countries to “normalize” relations by first 
resuming the composite dialogue on Kashmir, before promoting cultural exchanges among the 
two peoples. Pakistan would require additional security and incentives from Washington to 
reverse its historic Kashmir policy, and assurances from the United States that its role in 
promoting cordial Indo–Pakistan relations will be sustained in the long run.  
Finally, U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan must be delivered to the people who need it most. 
Rather than use aid for Pakistan’s debt relief, which has little impact on the country’s poor and 
socially deprived, Washington should support emerging NGOs, health organizations such as al-
Mustapha—a competitor to the well-established Edhi Foundation—women’s groups, rural 
development projects, shelters for the underprivileged, and select religious leaders. Western aid 
delivered directly to the people of Pakistan will have immediate short-term impact, improving 
America’s image in the country among the “average” Pakistani while serving the country’s long-
term interests.  
For the Government of Pakistan  
Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation with the United States has significant domestic and 
foreign policy advantages. For Pakistan to be a global competitor, it will need to rethink its current 
spending of Western aid, shifting some resources to improving the country’s socioeconomic 
strata while defending itself against potential threats and a new class of radical groups. Balancing 
aid for defense with greater investments in the educational sector, for example, will help the 
government focus on two issues of importance. The following measures by Islamabad can help to 
elevate Pakistan’s posture in the global market and guarantee long-term stability in the country:  
First, Pakistan must improve its funding and administration of public schools, offer teacher 
training programs, increase the standards of primary school education, broaden the scope of 
education in madaris, and encourage the expansion of private educational institutions. While the 
benefits reaped from these initiatives will be realized in the long-term, the country’s transient 
political actors should consider investing heavily in education today to guarantee the country’s 
survival in the future. This will require refocusing the country’s resources, time, and energy into 
the educational sector, both secular (public) and religious institutions. Without making some 
changes, Pakistan will not be able to tap into and nurture the country’s expertise, such as the 
youth’s technical aptitude.  
Second, Pakistan needs to reform its judicial system to win the public’s confidence in law and 
order maintained by the police, local law enforcement agencies, and the intelligentsia. Replacing 
the system of patronage within the services and other governmental agencies is a prerequisite to 
having an accountable and legitimately sound institution of justice. The government should 
consider allowing highly qualified civilians to hold senior positions, based on their knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to encourage the public to take part in the country’s political future. Pakistan 
also needs to prosecute individuals for corruption, including elite family businesses and military 
personnel. Needless to say, for institutions to be functional, the country’s feudal lords must be 
replaced by local governments who can represent the needs of the people rather than manipulate 
them.  
Third, Pakistan’s willingness to settle old scores with its neighbors in a realistic political timetable 
helps to set expectations and push the government to address more consistently the ‘high’ 
politics of peace and security with neighboring countries. Pakistan must create incentives to 
resolve peacefully the Kashmir crisis, the festering conflict in Baluchistan, tensions with the 
radical religious groups such as the Taliban and other militias in the NWFP and FATA, as well as 
find creative solutions to the Islamabad-New Delhi-Kabul axis of power. Pakistan should increase 
its diplomatic influence as an alternative to military might to reduce signs of an aggressive 
posture towards its neighbors. Addressing concerns that affect all neighboring countries, such as 
the threat of terrorism, can help to improve Islamabad’s bilateral relationships with other South 
Asian states and diminish longstanding international rivalries.  
Finally, a key to stability in Pakistan is to increase its bargaining power against violent political 
Islamists, to avoid intense competition between them and the state, and to undermine their 
overall influence in Pakistan’s civil society. While Washington can push Islamabad to disarm 
various militant groups operating in remote areas and along the border, only Pakistan can 
determine the right strategies for weakening the extremists’ resolve. As it remains a sensitive 
subject, Pakistan’s open attacks against violent political Islamists could create a backlash and 
facilitate further violence against the state. A more feasible strategy would be to accept all forms 
of expression and dissent within Pakistani society to avoid the appearance of autocratic rule. 
Dissent in Pakistan, however, has to be managed in such a way that it does not threaten the 
stability of the state nor force the state to take repressive action against opposing “parties.”  
Conclusion: Getting Pakistan Right[105]  
As increased fears of bomb attacks in Karachi and elsewhere plague Pakistan’s national security, 
it is more important than ever for America to nurture Pakistan along the path of stability for 
renewed cooperation in the war on terrorism. Failing to address the systemic problems in the 
country could accelerate militant Islam, “regional separatism, a renewed war with India,” and 
foment social unrest.[106]  
Now is the time for Washington to engage Pakistan on advancing its counterterrorism 
cooperation. As a recipient of U.S. military assistance and financial aid, Washington can have 
significant potential leverage with Pakistan. Binding Pakistan’s future cooperation to 
Washington’s demands to eradicate existing terrorist groups and the rise of new militants can be 
possible through continued U.S. financial support, deeper U.S.–Pakistani intelligence sharing, 
and a time-table that allows both sides to track progress. Above all, the bilateral relationship has 
to extend beyond the war on terror. As many Pakistanis have noted, the one-sided, one-track 
relationship will likely deepen an already skeptical Pakistan of future engagement between 
Washington and Islamabad. Thus, a relationship defined by economic progress, development, 
social reform, and women’s progress can have enormous benefits for Pakistan and the image of 
the United States as a sincere partner in the region.  
More importantly, long-term engagement with Pakistan can reverse the perception in Islamabad 
that the U.S. views Pakistan as the tactical ally, while India remains a natural ally. Long-term 
U.S.–Pakistan engagement will also reassure Islamabad that the risks it has taken for siding with 
America will outweigh the negative consequences of having to fight extremists at home while 
keeping violent political Islamists at a distance. So long as Pakistan is convinced that it will not 
lose favor with America, Islamabad will give considerable weight to Washington’s 
recommendations. So long as the United States keeps Pakistan engaged, Islamabad can be an 
enduring partner in the war on terror and beyond.  
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